effect of risk-taking incentives on both the magnitude and composition of firm risk. We find that when the incentive design … lacks RPE features, the incentive portfolio vega motivates CEOs to increase total risk through the systematic component … because it can be hedged. In contrast, when the incentive design includes RPE features, CEOs prefer idiosyncratic risk because …

taking on excessive risk?• What does it say about SEC rules that the results of this analysis are vastly different from the …

, but cannot always be eliminated. We apply our results to the choice between specialist and generalist middle managers …

minimizes income risk, only output-based pay encourages the agent to use his knowledge efficiently. In general, it is optimal to …

In many organizational contexts, managers might have self-serving incentives whereby giving high evaluations to … employees comes at the expense of their own payoff. In this study, I examine the impact of managers’ self-serving incentives on … the collection and use of information for the purpose of subjective performance evaluation. I find that managers with self …

reason, this study attempts to analyze the management of risk in Indonesian banks, relying particularly from the commonly …-prescribed indicators, such as; market risk, credit risk, and operational risk. These sets of indicators are analyzed to note the relational …