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We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSP is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012712993
-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSP is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200592
Transnational technical standard-setting has grown in prominence in recent years. The World Trade Organization (WTO …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919294
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of … ; Signaling game ; Communication game ; Dynamic stability ; Voronoi tesselation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921430
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated … and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is … robust to preplay communication between the bidders. If there are three or more symmetric bidders, or two symmetric bidders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009745257
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are …-uniformly distributed types. -- Cheap Talk ; Signaling Game ; Communication Game ; Voronoi tesselation ; Conflict of Interest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009388067
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193