By focusing on the two intercepts — the price and quantity intercepts — of inverse linear demands, this note shows that compared to uniform pricing, third-degree price discrimination can be neutral. When all price intercepts of sub-markets' inverse demands are the same, not only will all the...

We question the prevailing wisdom that a profit-maximizing monopolist using linear pricing cannot produce socially efficient output. We show that when market demand function exhibits a flat portion, the prevailing wisdom may not be true. Such a flat portion in demand is consistent with weakly...

This paper investigates the viability of Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing when firms compete without restrictions of a minimum payment requirement. We show that the equilibrium outcomes are different when underpayers, consumers paying less than marginal cost, are present as opposed to when they...

We compare second-degree price discrimination with uniform pricing using two linear demands. Our comparison shows that second-degree price discrimination can result in a welfare-enhancing market foreclosure (both markets are served under uniform pricing but one of them is excluded under...

Using a game theoretic framework, we show that not only can pay-what-you-want pricing generate positive profits, but it can also be more profitable than charging a fixed price to all consumers. Further, whenever it is more profitable, it is also Pareto-improving. We derive conditions in terms of...

This paper examines the relationship between tying and vertical integration when an input monopolist can require its downstream buyer to purchase a competitively supplied input from it, or integrate forward in the downstream market. We show tying is an imperfect substitute for vertical...