Central features of today’s electronic communications markets are complementarities between the different layers of the value chain, substitutability between some applications, network effects in the provision of content and services, two-sided business models that partly involve indirect...

Central features of today's electronic communications markets are complementarities between the different layers of the value chain, substitutability between some applications, network effects in the provision of content and services, two-sided business models that partly involve indirect...

We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality-dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observes the quality of the offered goods. Compared to the unregulated outcome, both profits and social welfare would...

This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the design of regulatory policy, focusing on the complications that arise when regulated suppliers have better information about the regulated industry than do regulators. The discussion begins by characterizing the optimal regulation of a monopoly...

This paper presents a game where the incumbent firm uses the price as a signal about demand size. Without observing the demand, the regulator has to decide if the entry of new firms will be allowed. The game has a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the incumbent firm chooses the...

In this paper we compare the costs of two regulatory policies about the entry of new firms. We consider an incumbent firm that has more information about the market demand than the regulator. Then, the incumbent firm can use this advantage to persuade the regulator to make entry more difficult....

We study a supply chain model where competing manufacturers located around a circle contract with privately informed and exclusive retailers. The number of brands in the market (determined by the manufacturers’ zero profit condition) depends on the level of asymmetric information within supply...

We revisit the choice of product differentiation by competing firms in the Hotelling model, under the assumption that firms are vertically separated, and that retailers choose products’ characteristics. We show that retailers with private information about their marginal costs choose to...

We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality-dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observe the quality of the offered goods. Compared to the unregulated outcome, both profits and social welfare would...

Abstract: We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality-dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observes the quality of the offered goods. Compared to the unregulated outcome, both profits and social welfare...