This paper studies the inference of interaction effects, i.e., the impacts of players' actions on each other's payoffs, in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We propose an easily implementable test for the signs of state-dependent interaction effects that does not require...

This paper examines whether and to what extent changes in beliefs about own HIV status induce changes in risky sexual behavior using data from married males living in three regions of Malawi. Risky behavior is measured as the propensity to engage in extramarital affairs. The empirical analysis...

We test implications of a simple equilibrium model of informality using a survey of 48,000 small firms in Brazil. In the model, agent's ability to manage production differ and informal firms face a higher cost of capital and limitation on size, although these informal firms avoid tax payments....

This paper investigates determinants of informal economic activity. We present an equilibrium model of informality and test its implications using a survey of 48,000 small firms in Brazil. We define informality as tax avoidance; firms in the informal sector avoid tax payments but suffer other...

This paper studies the identification of a simultaneous equation model involving duration measures. It proposes a game theoretic model in which durations are determined by strategic agents. In the absence of strategic motives, the model delivers a version of the generalized accelerated failure...

This paper examines whether and to what extent changes in beliefs about own HIV status induce changes in risky sexual behavior using data from married males living in three regions of Malawi. Risky behavior is measured as the propensity to engage in extramarital affairs. The empirical analysis...

This paper investigates determinants of informal economic activity. We present an equilibrium model of informality and test its implications using a survey of 48,000 small firms in Brazil. We define informality as tax avoidance; firms in the informal sector avoid tax payments but suffer other...

This paper studies the identification of a simultaneous equation model involving duration measures. It proposes a game theoretic model in which durations are determined by strategic agents. In the absence of strategic motives, the model delivers a version of the generalized accelerated failure...

This paper studies inference in a continuous time game where an agent's decision to quit an activity depends on the participation of other players. In equilibrium, similar actions can be explained not only by direct influences but also by correlated factors. Our model can be seen as a...

This paper studies the identification of a simultaneous equation model where the variable of interest is a duration measure. It proposes a game theoretic model in which durations are determined by strategic agents. In the absence of strategic motives, the model delivers a version of the...