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Nudges.gov : Behavioral Economics and Regulation
Sunstein, Cass R. - 2013
Behavioral economics is influencing regulatory initiatives in many nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom. The role of behavioral economics is likely to increase in the next generation, especially in light of the growing interest in low-cost, choice-preserving regulatory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086622
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Delegation of regulation
Kundu, Tapas; Nilssen, Tore - 2017
We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700470
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Delegation of Regulation
Kundu, Tapas - 2020
We discuss a government's incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade-off in its … and the firm's private information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation. Furthermore, we discuss how … that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift. Because of the nature of the regulation problem, the effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852548
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Delegation of regulation
Kundu, Tapas; Nilssen, Tore - 2017
We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779242
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Delegation of Regulation
Kundu, Tapas - 2017
We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949241
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Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules : A Triptych
Sunstein, Cass R. - 2013
Impersonal default rules, chosen by private or public institutions, establish settings and starting points for countless goods and activities -- cell phones, rental car agreements, computers, savings plans, health insurance, websites, privacy, and much more. Some of these rules do a great deal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089764
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The Dark Side of Nudging : The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism
McCrudden, Christopher - 2015
in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012598
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Manipulation As Theft
Sunstein, Cass R. - 2021
Should there be a right not to be manipulated? What kind of right? On Kantian grounds, manipulation, lies, and paternalistic coercion are moral wrongs, and for similar reasons; they deprive people of agency, insult their dignity, and fail to respect personal autonomy. On welfarist grounds,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220648
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Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias : The Role of Concavity
Tanner, Noam - 2019
A principal is uncertain of an agent's preferences and cannot provide monetary transfers. The principal, however, does control the discretion granted to the agent. In this paper, we provide a simple characterization of when it is optimal for the principal to screen by offering different terms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894211
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Delegating Performance Evaluation
Letina, Igor - 2018
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932366