We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e. markets in which all agents have heterogeneous … preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who …. We use our equivalence to show additional properties of matching markets with taxation and to adapt existing econometric …

We study matching policies in a dynamic exchange market with random compatibility, in which some agents are easier to …-off between a "thicker market" and quick matching is present in small markets we show that it vanishes in large markets and the … greedy policy nevertheless dominates any other dynamic matching policy. As arrival rate increases the greedy policy matches a …

We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over … potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate …

well-being and separation. We first estimate the marital surplus using a simple matching model of the marriage market with …

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise …

unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching …

We prove existence of steady-state equilibrium in a class of matching models with search frictions. …

We model monopsony on the labor market using a separable matching model a la Choo and Siow (2006). We propose a simple …

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodatenon-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatiblemechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designedto adequately accommodate a plethora of …