We study the effects of politics on public procurement in Swedish municipalities in 1990-98 using data on cleaning services. No procuring municipality committed to a standard auction format or to an explicit scoring rule. Political identity of the governing party is not correlated with the...

In a model of bank lending characterized by asymmetric information, we show that banks may use an interim monitoring technology strategically to soften price competition, even though the borrowers face no moral hazard problem. The interim monitoring technology can also be used to alleviate...

We use elections data in which a large number of ties in vote counts between candidates are resolved via a lottery to study the personal incumbency advantage. We benchmark non-experimental regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates against the estimate produced by this experiment that takes...

In this paper we study a horizontally differentiated market for financial in-termediation and develop a simple explanation for concentration in the financial intermediation industry. We show that under asymmetric information, if the demand for funds is not perfectly elastic, the heterogeneity of...