This paper shows how financial inequality and misbeliefs about group entitlements can increase the consensus for populist parties. Given a banking shock, traditional and populist parties propose alternative bailout policies, where short termism characterizes the populistic policy. The citizens...

Behavioral bias – loss aversion – can explain monetary policy inertia in setting interest rates. Economic literature has tended to explain inertia in monetary policymaking in terms of frictions and delays, or has stressed the role of governance rules. We introduce a new driver of inertia,...

This paper builds a model of populism called Democratic Rioting in which citizens – i.e. the poor and the rich - are assumed to be heavily influenced by psychological group dynamics that result from banking shocks. We highlight a display of anger that is channelled through an election instead...

Can the inertia in the monetary policymaking be attributed to psychological drivers? Our model shows two results. First, our baseline model with individual loss aversion explains inertia in a monetary policy committee (MPC) where holds a de jure majority rule. Second, our second model shows that...