I investigate the aggregate consequences of canonical financial frictions in the supply of credit to firms: private information and limited enforcement. I propose a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance their firm through a long-term contract with a financial intermediary. The...

Automotive manufacturers are known to use deadline-based convex incentives to motivate dealerships to sell new cars. This paper shows that dealerships respond to these incentive targets by pushing customers from used to new cars as the end of the month approaches, and that subprime loans written...

We explore Lithuanian credit register data and two bank closures to provide a novel estimate of firms' bank-switching costs and a novel identification of the hold-up problem. We show that when a distressed bank's closure forced firms to switch, these firms started borrowing at lower interest...

When there is asymmetric information between investors and firms, credit availability is affected by the value of collateralized productive assets. If liquidation occurs, investors recover a greater value the higher the probability to find a buyer and the higher his willingness to pay to use the...

It is commonly believed that borrowers cannot be anonymous in unsecured credit relations because anonymity heavily reduces the scope for punishment and therefore makes credit unfeasible except for very special circumstances. However, we demonstrate that credit is generally feasible even if...

We analyze the relationship between firm-specific shocks and aggregate fluctuations. In particular, profitability of firms affected by a negative shock worsens. To the extent that the banks cannot distinguish between aggregate and firm-specific profitability shocks, they will adjust interest...

Despite the importance of banks' role as delegated monitors, little is known about how non-price terms of loan contracts are structured to optimize information production in a lending relationship. Using a large sample of corporate loans, this paper examines the effect of relationship lending on...

This paper examines whether firm reputation impacts borrowing costs and thus investment. Using unique data from Fortune's Most Admired Companies surveys, I find that reputable borrowers enjoy lower borrowing costs and receive more favorable loan contract terms. My identification strategy is...

Using data from SEC filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and...