Based on the leximin and leximax preferences, we consider two threshold preference relations on the set X of alternatives, each of which is characterized by an n-dimensional vector (n ≥ 2) with integer components varying between 1 and m(m ≥ 2). We determine explicitly in terms of binomial...

Social Choice problem is defined for a finite set of alternatives A, over which a finite number of agents have preferences. Solution to the problem is a rule determining alternatives, which are the “best” to the group. The Condorcet winner is regarded as the best choice but it is absent in...

A unified matrix-vector representation is developed of such solution concepts as the core, the uncovered, the uncaptured, the minimal weakly stable, the minimal undominated, the minimal dominant and the untrapped sets. We also propose several new versions of solution sets

The paper uses an experimental approach to study the voting power distribution in the context of classical model, as well as in generalized form which takes into account players’ preferences to coalesce with each other. Our results extend those of Montero, Sefton & Zhang (2008), confirming...

A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take into account agents’ preferences to coalesce. An axiomatic characterization of intensity functions representing a desire of agents to coalesce is given. A set of axioms for new power indices is...

We present an analysis of the distribution of voting power in the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic based on the outcome of the nine general elections in the period 1919-1933. The paper contains a brief description of the political and electoral system of the Weimar Republic and a...

Data on economic, management and political science journals are used to produce quantitative estimates of (in)consistency of evaluations based on seven popular bibliometric indicators. This paper proposes a new approach to the construction of aggregate journal rankings: aggregation is considered...