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I show that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. The principal commits, while the agent's type evolution follows a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901976
The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012268393
). New contract language also includes dispute resolution provisions (e.g., jury waivers, forum selection clauses) that are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582006
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion of the borrower's net worth is forfeited to the lender. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919030
derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023
seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation, and the buyer evaluates each contract according to its worst-case performance … over a set of probability distributions. This paper demonstrates that the contract that maximizes the minimum payoff over … contract for any given probability distribution is a posted price, which induces bunching. Using the e-contamination model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855861
maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a …-optimal contract if the frequency of interactions is sufficiently high (or equivalently if the discount factor, time horizon and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158852
privately held and is unknown to the firm. By explicitly characterizing the optimal multilateral contract, we demonstrate how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011750141