We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US gov- ernment to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP – the government’s ability to ap- point independent directors on the board of...

This study offers insight into the role of board politicization on the Spanish cajas’ performance from a dual perspective.First, we analyze the effect of a new kind of political directors who occupy board seats as representatives of stakeholders outside the public administrations while...

Governmental laws and regulations play critical roles and have impacting influences and consequences on corporations and their management and stakeholders as well as the public at large. Sometimes legislative initiatives and administrative actions have detrimental effects on groups of persons,...

To protect fund investors against conflicting interests with fund management companies, U.S. funds have mandatory independent directors. That is not the case for funds in Europe, set-up in accordance with the UCITS Directive. Nevertheless, many UCITS funds have voluntarily appointed independent...

We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP - the government's ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an...

Improving the regulation of banks has been at the centre of economic policy actions since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. One of the many and conceptually very different measures proposed is to improve the corporate governance of banks by setting qualification standards for banks’...

Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a quasi-natural experiment, we explore how independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs. Generalist CEOs possess the general managerial skills that can be applied across firms and industries. Our difference-in-difference estimates...

We study the effect of board governance in state-owned and private banks by undertaking a study of commercial banks in India that has both bank groups. Covering a ten-year period from 2003 to 2012 that witnessed a large number of governance reforms in India, the results of our empirical analysis...

This study offers insight into the role of board politicization on the Spanish cajas' performance from a dual perspective. First, we analyze the effect of a new kind of political directors who occupy board seats as representatives of stakeholders outside the public administrations while...