Can investors with irrational beliefs be neglected as long as they are rational on average? Do their trades cancel out with no consequences on prices, as implicitly assumed by traditional models? We consider a model with irrational investors, who are rational on average. We obtain waves of...

It is an important issue for economic and finance applications to determine whether individuals exhibit a behavioral bias towards pessimism in their beliefs, in a lottery or more generally in an investment opportunities framework. In this paper, we analyze the answers of a sample of 1,540...

While gender gaps in average math performance are close to zero in developed countries, women are still strongly underrepresented among math high performers. Using data from five successive waves of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), we show that this underrepresentation...

We revisit the model proposed by Gollier and Muermann (see Gollier, C. and A. Muermann, 2010, Optimal choice and beliefs with exante savoring and ex-post disappointment, Management Sci., 56, 1272-1284, hereafter GM). In GM, for a given lottery, agents form anticipated expected payoffs and the...

We address the problem of a social planner who, as in Weitzman (2001), gathers data on experts' discount rates and wants to infer the socially efficient consumption discount rate. We propose an ‘equilibrium approach' and we analyse the expression and the properties of the resulting...

We study the effects of the presence of a negative stereotype on the formation of self-confidence and on decision-making in achievement-related situations. We take into account not only consumption utility but also psychological utility (ex-ante ego utility and ex-post disappointment/elation)....

We provide a discipline for belief formation through a model of subjective beliefs, in which agents hold incorrect but strategic beliefs. More precisely, we consider beliefs as a strategic variable that agents can choose (consciously or not) in order to maximize their utility at the equilibrium....

Can investors with irrational beliefs be neglected as long as they are rational on average? Does unbiased diagreement lead to trades that cancel out with no consequences on prices, as implicitly assumed by the traditional models? We show in this paper that there is an important impact of...

We provide a discipline for belief formation through a model of subjective beliefs, in which agents hold incorrect but strategic beliefs. More precisely, we consider beliefs as a strategic variable that agents can choose (consciously or not) in order to maximize their utility at the equilibrium....

Can behavioral investors be neglected as long as they are rational on average? We show in this paper that there is an important impact of such investors on the behavior of financial markets, even though the pricing formulas are quot;on averagequot; (over the states of the world) unchanged. In...