This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy-interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a proto-coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policy within that coalition. The equilibrium policy in the legislative bargaining stage maximizes the...

We develop a theory of policy implementation and elections that examines the conditions under which observable policy sabotage --- that is, the deliberate choice by an opposition party to block the implementation of a policy --- can be an effective electoral strategy. From the perspective of...

We present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies, yet agree on certain common objectives. Policy developers can appeal to a decisionmaker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals. These investments are specific to a...

We present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies, yet agree on certain common objectives. Policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals. These investments are specific to a...

In political environments, the process of developing new policies often involves competing factions or entrepreneurs, who make productive investments to make their proposals more appealing to decisionmakers. The ideologies and abilities of these factions is often highly asymmetric, e.g.,...