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Optimal Executive Compensation : Stock Options or Restricted Stocks

Wu, Yan Wendy - 2020

This paper develops an agency model to analyze the optimality of executive stock option compensation in the presence of information manipulation. The analyses show that although information manipulation is positively related to the size of option compensation, the relative size of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857493

Internal vs External CEO Choice and the Structure of Compensation Contracts

Peyrache, Eloic - 2013

Any firm choosing a CEO faces a double problem: candidate selection and choice of a compensation scheme. We derive sufficient conditions where the unique optimal compensation scheme is a capped-bonus contract in a pure moral-hazard environment, while equity is used when the firm also faces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094697

Differential Risk Taking Implications of Performance Incentives from Stock and Stock Option Holdings

Savaser, Tanseli - 2016

In this paper, we study the risk taking implications of managerial pay-for-performance incentives (delta). The extant empirical literature is built on the presumption that each unit of delta has an equal risk inducing effect regardless of its source. Instead, following the predictions of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984270

The determinants of the German corporate governance rating

Drobetz, Wolfgang; Gugler, Klaus; Hirschvogl, Simone - 2004

This paper analyzes the determinants of the German corporate governance rating recently developed by Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004). We find a non- linear relationship between ownership concentration and the quality of firmlevel corporate governance as measured by the rating. Firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011570371

The basic governance structure of public corporations : the interests of shareholders as a class

Armour, John; Enriques, Luca; Hansmann, Henry B.; … - 2017

This paper is the third chapter of the third edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler, Georg Ringe, and Edward Rock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674062

Policy Uncertainty, Corporate Risk-Taking, and CEO Incentives

Ion, Mihai - 2017

Using a news-based index of aggregate policy uncertainty in the US economy, we document a strong negative relation between policy uncertainty and corporate risk-taking. We show that high levels of policy uncertainty are associated with significantly lower future stock return volatility at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947474

A Model of Industry Tournament Incentives

Coles, Jeffrey L. - 2020

, and Wang (2018, 2017) and is suggestive of the nature of tournament incentives among mutual fund managers (Brown, Harlow …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842651

Managerial Compensation and Private Foundation Performance

Allen, Arthur C. - 2016

foundations are often poorly monitored and foundation managers are often rewarded for poor performance. We discuss potential …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009156

Are Incentive Stock Options Signaling Better Corporate Governance? - An Evidence from Equity Carve-Outs

Seistrajkova, Biljana - 2017

I analyze the long-run performance and earnings management behavior of equity carve-outs conditioned on whether the executives received incentive stock options at the IPO date. Carve-outs that did not grant incentive stock options subsequently underperform both relative to the overall market and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968395

Managers’ Stock-Based Compensation and Disclosures of High Proprietary Cost Information : An Investigation of US Biotech Firms

Enache, Luminita - 2020

proprietary information. While prior studies suggest that stock-based compensation provides managers with an incentive to enhance … that, on average, managers' stock-based compensation is not significantly related with their disclosure of high proprietary … cost information. More importantly, we find that a larger amount of stock-based compensation motivates managers to reveal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853081