, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …

set ex ante explicit severance pay agreements as one component in managing the optimal level of equity incentives. Younger … post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …

set ex ante explicit severance pay agreements as one component in managing the optimal level of equity incentives. Younger … post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …

-merger performance. These results hold controlling for CEO overconfidence and cannot be attributed to firms altering incentives to induce …

We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation packages once their firms are …

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk-taking incentives into their … credit risk evaluation. We measure risk-taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock … impound managerial risk-taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard …

I estimate a dynamic agency model to quantify the importance of dismissals in CEO incentives -vis-à-vis pecuniary …

incentives: pay-performance elasticity (PPE), semi-elasticity (PPSE), and sensitivity (PPS). Larger, more R&D intensive, and low …, suggesting that the average firm's incentives are at the low end of the optimal range. Overall, the results obtained with the PPE …