We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …

subjects to punish free-riders increases cooperation in the public goods game, and that the degree of punishment is sensitive … cadets' reluctance or willingness to punish non-cooperators in a public goods experiment. We employ a standard public goods … game with punishment, but in addition to knowing how much each player contributed to the group good, subjects also know the …

punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to … individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under … perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a …

welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate … aggression. In this lab experiment, we find that adopting an objective attitude (Objective), through a form of emotion regulation …

welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate … aggression. In this lab experiment, we find that adopting an objective attitude (objective), through a form of emotion regulation …

This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an economic experiment …, punishment by a third party (Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). This deliberate … introduction of a second potential punisher is neither subtle nor marginal. Shifting punishment choices into this “enlarged …

goods game with endogenous third-party punishment in matrilineal and patriarchal societies in India. Our findings indicate …

with endogenous third-party punishment in matrilineal and patriarchal societies in India. Our findings indicate that …

: that altruistic punishment can sustain cooperation. This paper extends their model in order to explain such recent findings …. It focuses on fear of punishment, not punishment itself, as the key mechanism to sustain contributions to the public good … differs, on average, in less than 5% compared to relevant experiments with punishment in the lab. …