We show that statistical tests of OPEC behavior have very low power across a wide range of alternative hypotheses regarding market structure. Consequently, it is difficult, given the current availability and precision of data on demand and costs, to distinguish collusive from competitive...

This paper extends the existing theory and empirical investigation of unitization contracts. It highlights the importance of incentive-compatibility and self-enforcement and the bargaining problems faced in achieving viable, long-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization...

Alternative market structures are distinguishable by the degree of parallel action exhibited by producers. We show that the correlation between output levels varies systematically with the degree of interdependence among firms, and establish an ordering among alternative behavioral hypotheses...

We examine the value of a petroleum exploration prospect that is to be exploited via a series of possibly dependent trials. The pattern and strength of dependence among trials is linked to a real option that affects the expected economic value of the prospect. We develop an exact, yet intuitive,...

We examine whether expert appraisals provided to bidders before major art auctions are unbiased indicators of value. Despite a strong grounding in theory, this aspect of optimal auction design has been frequently challenged in previous empirical research, particularly in the market for fine art....