We present the first study to estimate the causal effect of liquidity regulation on bank balance sheets. It takes advantage of the heterogeneous implementation of tighter liquidity regulation by the UK Financial Services Authority in 2010. We find that banks adjusted the composition of both...

We present a network model of the interbank market in which optimizing risk averse banks lend to each other and invest in non-liquid assets. Market clearing takes place through a tâtonnement process which yields the equilibrium price, while traded quantities are determined by means of a...

A bank's decision on loan supply and capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank's future costs of external finance and future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. We study these...

We introduce a general equilibrium model to analyze the interactions between liquidity regulations and banks' investment in complex assets. Complexity improves bank liquidity in good times but heightens vulnerability to runs during crises. Banks underinvest in complex assets when liquidity...

This paper proposes a novel methodology to calibrate the magnitude of the cap on the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) using market-based stress tests. The macroprudential authority in our paper aims to contain the possibility of a breach of a minimum capital ratio in the event of a severe...

Prudential liquidity requirements are a relatively recent regulatory tool on the international front, introduced as part of the Basel III accord in the form of a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and a net stable funding ratio (NSFR). I first discuss the rationale for regulating bank liquidity by...

Business cycles imply liquidity risks for banks. This paper explores how these risks influence bank lending over the cycle. With forward-looking banks, lending cycles, credit booms and busts, or suppressed and highly fragile bank systems can emerge, depending on the magnitude of liquidity risks....

We evaluate the effects of post-crisis liquidity regulation on the U.S. banking system. We find that regulated banks have substantially improved their liquidity ratios by holding more liquidity buffers and terming out their liabilities. However, some liquidity transformation has migrated to...

Pierret (2015) presents empirical analysis of the solvency-liquidity nexus for the banking system, documenting that a shock to the level of banks' solvency risk is followed by lower short-term debt. Conversely, higher short-term debt Granger-causes higher solvency risk. These results point...

We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to jointly study various regulations in the presence of credit and run risk. Banks choose between liquid and illiquid assets on the asset side, and between deposits and equity on the liability side. The endogenously determined asset...