We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on firm cash holdings and the value of cash. We document a positive relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. This positive effect is magnified by firm leverage and mitigated by the presence of financial...

We study reputation incentives in the director labor market and find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their effort unequally based on the directorship's relative prestige. When directors experience an exogenous increase in a directorship's relative ranking, their board...

This paper analyzes which stock option scheme best aligns the interests of a firm's manager and shareholders when both are risk-averse. We consider granting to the manager a basic fixed salary and one of the following four options: European, Parisian, Asian and American options. Choosing the...

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to...

We provide evidence that there has been a fundamental change in the relationship between managerial risk taking incentives and firm risk after 2002, a period characterized by significant regulatory changes concerning executive compensation practices in public corporations. A consequence of the...

This paper examines the mechanisms by which acquirer CEOs are incentivized and their impact on merger decisions. We argue that the pre-merger structure of CEO wealth impacts a CEO's risk tolerance and ultimately her willingness to undertake a merger as well as the framework of the deal. As the...