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An Overview of the Executive Remuneration Issue Across the Crisis

Ferrarini, Guido - 2013

The paper outlines the developments in the EU regulatory framework for executive remuneration since 2004 and going through the financial crisis. It also presents the results of an analysis of the remuneration practices adopted by the largest European listed firms before and after the crisis,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073163

Corporate Lobbying and CEO Pay

Skaife, Hollis Ashbaugh - 2013

This study examines the agency costs of corporate lobbying by exploring the relation between lobbying and excess CEO compensation. We show that CEOs of firms engaged in lobbying earn significantly greater compensation levels compared to CEOs in non-lobbying firms, after controlling for standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074468

Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets : Empirical Evidence from China

Wang, Jiwei - 2013

performance because cross-subsidization makes it difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong firms accountable for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074547

How (if any) Uniform Corporate Governance Measures Matter for Executive Compensation Practice at Closely-Held Banks

Slomka-Golebiowska, Agnieszka - 2013

The aim of this paper is to examine the executive compensation practices in closely-held financial institutions where the corporate governance conflict lies between the blockholder on one hand and minority shareholders and depositors on the other. We study the determinants of the level of bank's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075367

How Do Managerial Incentives Affect the Maturity Structure of Corporate Public Debt?

Tanaka, Takanori - 2016

I examine the relation between managerial ownership and the maturity structure of corporate public debt by using a sample of newly issued Japanese corporate bonds. Firms with higher managerial ownership issue shorter maturity bonds. In addition, firms with higher managerial ownership have lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000163

The Relationship between Institutional Investor and Remuneration in Family Firm

Jaafar, Syaiful Baharee - 2016

remaining board motivation higher remuneration should be awarded especially to family executive due to top position is among … them. This study examined the relationship between the institutional investor and remuneration in family firm. Based on the … effectiveness of institutional investor role. In addition, evidence shows that family firm is significant positive with director …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000862

CEO Overconfidence and the Cost of Private Debt : Evidences from Bank Loan Contracting

Chen, Yehning - 2016

This paper studies whether banks charge higher or lower interest rates on loans to firms with overconfident CEOs. It establishes a theoretical model to show the relationship between the loan rate and overconfidence of the borrowing firm's CEO. It also conducts empirical analyses to test the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000941

CEO's Inside Debt and Dynamics of Capital Structure

Brisker, Eric R. - 2016

Debt-type compensation (i.e., inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preference between the CEO and shareholders that in turn affects the firm's capital structure decisions. An excessively risk-averse CEO uses debt that falls short of the shareholders' desired level, and is eager to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000976

Financial Decisions and Ownership Structure as Control Mechanisms of Agency Problems : Evidence from Italy

Rossi, Fabrizio - 2018

Purpose – The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial decisions and ownership structure using the control contests on a sample of Italian listed companies.Design/methodology/approach – The analysis adopts a balanced panel data-set of 984 firm-year observations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927427

Promoting the Quiet Life or Risk-Taking? CEO Severance Contracts and Managerial Decision-Making

Muscarella, Chris J. - 2015

Using CEO severance contracts during 1992-2010, we find that CEOs with a severance contract tend to reduce corporate investments, impede innovation, and decrease firm risk across several dimensions, leading to shareholder value destruction. This negative value effect is stronger during the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038171