We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equity-backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....

We find that common equity firms pay lower D&O insurance premiums than income trusts, an alternative and riskier ownership form. This result has wide-ranging implications for investors insofar as the information provided by D&O insurers provides investors with an unbiased signal of the firm's...

This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...

We examine the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests may influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive...

We investigate the association between financial performance and CEO hiring source: internal promotion or external firm. This analysis includes all U.S. CEOs in established public firms from 1986 to 2005. The results show that in large firms, internal hires provide significantly higher median...

We evaluate the effects of management ownership and other corporate governance variables on Hong Kong firms' stock performance following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98), a period during which corporate governance structures to protect the interests of outside shareholders are...

Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...

This paper examines whether and how managerial ability affects the likelihood of goodwill impairment of Chinese publicly listed companies over the period 2007-2017. We document a negative relationship between goodwill impairment and managerial ability, and uncover the mediation effect of...

We examine the implications of CEO gender for corporate debt structure. After controlling for endogeneity, firms with female CEOs issue less debt than firms with male CEOs. Although both risk aversion and overconfidence may serve as the channel of our main finding, we show that female CEOs being...