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Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger Andreas - 2022

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals’ incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296722

Estimating Vitamin Cartel’s Overcharges : A Time-Series Approach

Mehta, Kirtikumar - 2023

An important issue in estimating cartel overcharges is to have a reliable estimate of the but-for-the-cartel price …. While the cartel price is observable, the but-for-the-cartel price is not. A construction of the but-for-cartel … previous non-cartelised period or constructs on cost-based data and mark-ups the but-for-price over the cartel period. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348952

Efficient Cartelization Through Buyer Groups

Doyle, Chris; Han, Martijn A. - 2012

In industries with unobservable wholesale contracting, retailers may enjoy cartel rents in their output market through … suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an 'implied cartel' depends on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210785

Gender and collusion

Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886259

Macroeconomic Effects of Market Structure Distortions : Evidence from French Cartels

Moreau, Flavien; Panon, Ludovic - 2022

Competition Authority. These practices are widely spread across sectors and cartel members are typically among the top firms in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082659

Paving the Way for Unfair Competition : The Imposition of EU Anti-Dumping Duties on Ceramic Tiles from China

Kasteng, Jonas - 2012

The report identifies concerns with the EU anti-dumping instrument, as applied today, regardless of the fact that the investigation procedures and methods might be in line with the current regulation and practice. The report's arguments are based on the recent anti-dumping investigation – and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109757

Settlements and appeals in the European Commission's cartel cases : an empirical assessment

Hellwig, Michael; Hüschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich - 2016

of cartel investigations by the European Commission (EC). We use a data set consisting of 579 firms groups convicted by … undisputed key contribution of a faster and more efficient handling of cartel investigations by the EC. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419416

The settlement procedure in EC cartel cases : an empirical assesment

Hüschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich - 2015

procedural efficiency of cartel enforcement in the European Union (EU). We use a data set consisting of 84 cartels decided by the … EC from 2000 to 2014 to empirically investigate the impact of the EU settlement procedure on the duration of cartel … cartel enforcement in the European Union substantially. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316390

Do cartel breakdowns induce mergers? : evidence from EC cartel cases

Hüschelrath, Kai; Smuda, Florian - 2013

We investigate the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger activity. Merging information on cartel cases decided by the … average number of all merger transactions increase by up to 51 percent when comparing the three years before the cartel … even more – by up to 83 percent – after the cartel breakdowns. Our results not only suggest that competition authorities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751721

Time is money – how much money is time? : interest and inflation in competition law actions for damages

Bueren, Eckart; Hüschelrath, Kai; Veith, Tobias - 2014

. Effective private enforcement requires that cartel victims can receive (at least) full compensation for the harm suffered …. Academics and competition authorities support this goal with guidance for the calculation of cartel damages. However, they … several years until cartel victims obtain damages. Interest and inflation are thus two key drivers of adequate compensation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233583