1999 and 2016 - to investigate the determinants of the duration of a firm's participation in a cartel. Applying a Weibull … firms show an increased probability to leave a cartel if prior exits occurred as well as in periods of high demand growth …. However, we find a reduced exit probability in situations of prior entries to the cartel or in periods of high interest rates …

Cartels have a significantly negative impact on economic welfare. Anti-cartel competition law — such as the provisions … integrates both economic and moral factors. It does so by emphasising the relationship of cartel behaviour to the moral duty to … affording a principled foundation for the current framework of cartel regulation in Australia …

We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel enforcement process in the … European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a first step, we present a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by … the European Commission (EC) with respect to various criteria such as the number of involved firm groups, cartel market …

-core cartels. We design a mechanism to form a hard-core cartel, which allows that multiple ringleaders emerge. Ringleaders often … "whistleblowers'" except for ringleaders may therefore reduce the incentive to become a ringleader and disrupt cartel formation. Yet … effect ultimately facilitates coordination in the explicit cartel …

of cartel investigations by the European Commission (EC). We use a data set consisting of 579 firms groups convicted by … undisputed key contribution of a faster and more efficient handling of cartel investigations by the EC …

stopped, while products with three or four cartel firms return to pre-conspiracy pricing, or lower, quite quickly. Although it …

computationally and doctrinally assessing all cartel fines based on the Fining Guidelines from 2006 until 2020. In doing so, we also …. In addition, the uncovered fining methodology reveals that the Commission plays it very safe when setting cartel fines …

competition law and policy. Beyond this question, it is unclear whether law and the Cartel Office can detect margin squeeze …