In many multi-unit auctions, bidders' valuations for a particular good depend on whether or not they also win the auction for another good. In these environments, the auctioneer can allow bidders to reflect these complementarities through additional bidding mechanisms. This paper studies the...

We develop a theoretical framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and limited arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using micro-data from the Iberian...

We develop a theoretical framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and limited arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian...

In this paper, we test the Coase theorem in the context of carbon emissions trading. We investigate whether generating firms were influenced in their operational decisions by the initial amount of grandfathered emissions in the trial period of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS)....

We measure the pass-through of emissions costs to electricity prices. We perform both reduced-form and structural estimations based on optimal bidding in this market. Using rich micro-level data, we estimate the channels affecting pass-through in a flexible manner, with minimal functional form...

We explore the long run dynamic implications of subjecting an imperfectly competitive industry to market-based pollution regulation. We are particularly interested in understanding how the allocation of emissions permits in a cap-and-trade program can influence the evolution of a trade exposed...