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When Knowledge Isn't Power : Asymmetric Information, Probabilistic Deceit Detection and Threats in Ultimatum Bargaining

Ferreira, Mark - 2016

We find that probabilistic deceit detection and cheap-talk threats enhance the fairness and honesty of a bargainer who possesses advantageous information and has the opportunity to be deceitful. In our ultimatum game, only proposers know the size of the pie. Proposers, therefore, have the option...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003880

Strategic Self-Interest Can Explain Seemingly 'Fair' Offers in the Ultimatum Game

Wells, Jordan; Rand, David G. - 2013

Behavioral and economic analysis of law fundamentally depends on understanding what motivates individual actors. While it is often assumed that people care only about maximizing their own monetary payoff, recent experimental work has challenged this assumption. A canonical example involves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166293

Pricing and Trust

Huck, Steffen; Lünser, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2007

price above the oligopoly price and below the monopoly price. The effect in monopolies is more or less in line with standard … intuition. As price falls volume increases and so does quality, such that overall efficiency is raised by 50%. However, quite in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053130

Experiments in Competitive Product Positioning : Actual Behavior Compared to Nash Solutions

Albers, Sönke; Marks, Ulf G. - 2002

, price, and marketing budget under various market conditions. We compare the players' final configurations to Nash equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034113

Experiments In Competitive Product Positioning : Actual Behavior Compared To Nash Solutions

Marks, Ulf G.; Albers, Sönke - In: Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr) 53 (2001) 3, pp. 150-174

, price, and marketing budget under various market conditions. We compare the players’ final configurations to Nash equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005736901

Retail pricing format and rigidity of regular prices

Ray, Sourav; Snir, Avichai; Levy, Daniel C. - 2023 - Revised: April 29, 2023

We study the price rigidity of regular and sale prices, and how it is affected by pricing formats (i.e., pricing … strategies). We use data from three large Canadian stores with different pricing formats (Every-Day-Low-Price, Hi-Lo, and Hybrid … regular prices as displayed on the store shelves. We combine these data with two "generated" regular price series (filtered …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014308231

Bargaining and delay in trading networks

Bedayo, Mikel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2013

We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702239

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083

Bargaining to lose the global commons

Chichilnisky-Heal, Natasha; Chichilnisky, Graciela - 2015

In "Bargaining to Lose: The Permeability Approach to Post Transition Resource Extraction" [1] Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal introduces an original and fertile explanation for the resource curse. Her "permeability" approach questions the treatment of the state as a decision maker having the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011438819

Efficiency versus equality in bargaining

Galeotti, Fabio; Montero, María; Poulsen, Anders - 2015

We report experimental data from bargaining situations where bargainers can make proposals as often and whenever they want, and can communicate via written messages. We vary the set of feasible contracts, thereby allowing us to assess the focality of three properties of bargaining outcomes:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011384455