In this paper we study the implications of service level guarantees (SLGs) in a model of oligopoly competition where providers compete to deliver a service to congestion-sensitive consumers. The SLG is a contractual obligation on the part of the service provider: regardless of how many customers...

Much of the classical work on algorithms for multi-armed bandits focuses on rewards that are stationary over time. By contrast, we study multi-armed bandit (MAB) games, where the rewards obtained by an agent also depend on how many other agents choose the same arm (as might be the case in many...

Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. We study a game-theoretic model in which "applicants" and "employers" pay costs to search and screen. An important...

We analyze investment incentives and market structure under oligopoly competition in service industries with congestion effects. We consider situations where firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices and investments; increasing investment reduces the congestion disutility experienced by...

We analyze investment incentives and market structure under oligopoly competition in industries with congestion effects. Our results are particularly focused on models inspired by modern technology-based services, such as telecommunications and computing services. We consider situations where...

A seller in an online marketplace with an effective reputation mechanism should expect that dishonest behavior results in higher payments now, while honest behavior results in higher reputation – and thus higher payments – in the future. We study two widely used classes of reputation...

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical distribution of the states of other players. Such games can be used...

We study learning in a dynamic setting where identical copies of a good are sold over time through a sequence of second price auctions. Each agent in the market has an 'unknown' independent private valuation which determines the distribution of the reward she obtains from the good; for example,...

Online platforms collect rich information about participants and then share some of this information back with them to improve market outcomes. In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in two-sided markets: If a platform wants to maximize revenue, which sellers should...