In the Seel–Strack contest (J Econ Theory 148(5):2033–2048, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">2013</CitationRef>), <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>n</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> agents each privately observe an independent copy of a drifting Brownian motion which starts above zero and is absorbed at zero. Each agent chooses when to stop the process she observes, and the winner of the...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></citationref>

This paper studies a variant of the contest model introduced by Seel and Strack. In the Seel-Strack contest, each agent or contestant privately observes a Brownian motion, absorbed at zero, and chooses when to stop it. The winner of the contest is the contestant who stops at the highest value....

This paper discusses the gambling contest introduced in Seel & Strack (Gambling in contests, Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 375, Mar 2012.) and considers the impact of adding a penalty associated with failure to follow a winning strategy....

Hundreds of billions of dollars have been invested to construct development zones (DZs) in China with the intent of fostering economic growth. Previous studies show that DZs benefit the local economy, but little attention has been paid to the environmental impacts. Based on statistical data and...