consensus values. Strategic coordination can consequently explain poor performances of prediction markets as resulting from the … behavioral working mechanisms have not yet been described. We thus put forth an exploratory experiment on the emergence and … robustness of coordination in a forecasting setting implementing contradictory incentives for accurate forecasts and coordination …

forecasting experiment, we find monetary incentives to substantially reduce and higher task complexity and risk to increase the …

consensus values. Strategic coordination can consequently explain poor performances of prediction markets as resulting from the … behavioral working mechanisms have not yet been described. We thus put forth an exploratory experiment on the emergence and … robustness of coordination in a forecasting setting implementing contradictory incentives for accurate forecasts and coordination …

consensus values. Strategic coordination can consequently explain poor performances of prediction markets as resulting from the … behavioral working mechanisms have not yet been described. We thus put forth an exploratory experiment on the emergence and … robustness of coordination in a forecasting setting implementing contradictory incentives for accurate forecasts and coordination …

messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …

relationship between forecast revisions and forecast errors. When analysts excessively integrate information in their revisions (i ….e. overreact), their forecast revisions are too intense, and the converse occurs when they underreact. As a proxy for uncertainty … sample using analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for uncertainty and obtain similar results. We also document the fact …

We design a laboratory experiment to study behavior in a multidivisional organization facing a trade-off between … than predicted coordination in centralized organizations. We show that the observed deviations disappear when uncertainty …

We study forecast dispersion in a finite-player forecasting game modeled as an aggregate game with payoff externalities … forecast from the average forecast; and with a finite number of agents, the agents can strategically in influence that average … find that when each agent prefers to be close to the average forecast, the presence of strategic manipulation of the …