This paper discusses two ways to amend the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) to change its long-run implications so that firm growth and exit driven by borrowing constraints exist in the long run. One way assumes that the entrepreneur...

This paper discusses two variations to the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). One variation assumes that the entrepreneur is less patient than the bank, and the other assumes the bank has limited commitment. The qualitative properties...

This paper discusses two ways to amend the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) to change its long-run implications so that firm growth and exit driven by borrowing constraints exist in the long run. One way assumes that the entrepreneur...

Analyses of zombie firms have emphasised the role of bank financing as the reason for zombie survival. This conclusion was made despite no comparative analysis of the sources of external finance for zombie firms. This paper provides the first analysis of that sort using Finnish data....

The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze the effect of financial constraint, information asymetry on the firm investment. On the basis of a data relating to 394 Tunisian firms observed over the period 2001-2008 and by adopting the panel data method, our findings show that the effect of...

Since the fall of communism, the former Soviet Union experienced a strong output decline and a dramatic increase in arrears and barter. We develop a model which explains how these three phenomena are connected. We introduce liquidity and credit constraints into a model of disorganization and...

Recently, Blanchard and Kremer (BK) argued that disorganization has led to the output decline in the former Soviet Union. In this paper we introduce liquidity and credit constraints into the BK model and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up problem. We argue further that barter...