This paper discusses two ways to amend the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) to change its long-run implications so that firm growth and exit driven by borrowing constraints exist in the long run. One way assumes that the entrepreneur...

This paper discusses two variations to the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). One variation assumes that the entrepreneur is less patient than the bank, and the other assumes the bank has limited commitment. The qualitative properties...

This paper discusses two ways to amend the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) to change its long-run implications so that firm growth and exit driven by borrowing constraints exist in the long run. One way assumes that the entrepreneur...

Cooperation among firms is governed by contracts. An interesting phenomenon is that some contracts are comprehensive while some are limited. This study tries to explain different levels of incompleteness of contracts that firms choose to govern their cooperation with. We find that a limited...

Analyses of zombie firms have emphasised the role of bank financing as the reason for zombie survival. This conclusion was made despite no comparative analysis of the sources of external finance for zombie firms. This paper provides the first analysis of that sort using Finnish data....