We study how the powerful perceive power abuse, and how negative experience related to it influences the appropriateness judgments of the powerless. We create an environment conducive to unfair exploitation in a repeated Public Goods game where one player (punisher) is given a further ability to...

We study experimentally how individuals learn from observing the choices of others in a non-stationary stochastic environment. The imitation choices of participants with low score in an intelligence test are driven solely by the value of imitation. High intelligence score participants, in...

We study a dynamic common pool resource game in which current resource stock depends on resource extraction in the previous period. Our model shows that for a sufficiently high regrowth rate, there is no commons dilemma: the resource will be preserved indefinitely in equilibrium. Lower growth...

We study how the powerful perceive power abuse, and how negative experience related to it influences the appropriateness judgments of the powerless. We create an environment conducive to unfair exploitation in a repeated Public Goods game where one player (punisher) is given a further ability to...

Recent models of prosociality suggest that cooperation in laboratory games may be better understood as resulting from concern for social norms than from prosocial preferences over outcomes. Underlying this interpretation is the idea that people exhibit heterogeneous respect for shared norms. We...

Punishment is understood to be necessary to the creation and maintenance of social norms. We argue that it can be driven by resentment that arises when norms are violated. Using a model of endogenous norms, we show how to define a norm-violation on any game or choice set and how to predict which...