We study an individual who faces a dynamic decision problem in which the process of information arrival is unobserved by the analyst. We derive two utility representations of preferences over menus of acts that capture the individual’s uncertainty about his future beliefs. The most general...

Following Kreps (1979), we consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste for immediate consumption. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...

In the terminology of classical signaling models we capture the impression that high types may send lower signals than low types in order not to appear too desperate. Overeagerness of low types or conversely modesty of high types can be described by our model. In contrast to the...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient, which represent second-stage choice problems. The recipient is only aware of second-stage choice of an allocation. Not choosing the normatively best allocation in the...

Following Kreps (1979), I consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for flexibility. When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with additional alternatives....