Landlords appear to use stale information when setting rents. Among over 43,000 California rental houses in 2018-2019, those last purchased during 2005-2007 (the peak) rent for 2-3% more than those purchased during 2008-2010 (bust). Neither house nor landlord characteristics explain this...

We analyze two managerial compensation incentive devices: the threat of termination and pay for performance. We first develop a simple model predicting that these devices are substitutes: when termination incentives are low, optimal contracts provide stronger pay-for-performance incentives. We...

We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3% of the incremental...

We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3 percent of the incremental...

At any point in time, most firms are not in financial distress. This implies that they must suffer value losses unrelated to their leverage before becoming financially distressed. We first show that if estimates of ex-ante distress costs are not filtered of such non-debt related value declines,...