We explore the interaction between the allocation of decision rights over investment opportunities and the design of incentive contracts to induce unobservable effort in a multiagent, multitasking agency framework. These are linked in our model because the only available performance measures...

We explore the interaction between the allocation of decision rights over investment opportunities and the design of incentive contracts to induce unobservable effort in a multiagent, multitasking agency framework. These are linked in our model because the only available performance measures...

We critically review the emerging literature in Organizational and Personnel Economics concerning the role of managers and management practices. Our focus is on the middle managers who populate the hierarchies between top executives and front-line employees. We are especially concerned with...

In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. This...