-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study … one school, is better for all students. We also examine systems with two stages of admissions, which has also been …

Interdistrict school choice programs-where a student can be assigned to a school outside of her district-are widespread … school choice and present two mechanisms that produce stable or efficient assignments. We consider three categories of policy … school choice, we provide a new avenue of research in market design …

We consider a stable improvement problem in a controlled school choice model which covers those of several previous … studies. First, we consider the case where the priority for each school is a weak order. We derive a sufficient condition for …

We study self-selection in centralized school choice, a strategy that takes place when students submit preferences … schools are zero, she may not rank them even when the mechanism is strategyproof. Using data from the Mexico City high school … mistake. These findings question the effectiveness of equal access provided by school choice, and we argue it can be improved …

We consider a controlled school choice model where students are divided into several types such as socioeconomically … advantaged and disadvantaged. The priority for a school is dependent on the type distribution of the assignment. Our model is a …. We consider the case where the priority for each school is represented by a weak order and introduce a stable and group …

We compare the manipulability of school choice mechanisms based on the occurrence of dominant strategies. We …

School choice programs aim to give students the option to choose their school. At the same time, underrepresented … each school, and to require that no school be assigned more majority students than its majority quota. An alternative way … is to reserve some seats at each school for the minority students, and to require that a reserve seat at a school be …

We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed … disadvantaged if the school priorities are based on ex ante known (social) differences of the applicants. …

School districts in the US and around the world are increasingly moving away from traditional neighborhood school … district boundaries. This creates a market with parental demand over publicly-supplied school seats. More frequently than ever …, this market for school seats is cleared via market design solutions grounded in recent advances in matching and mechanism …

strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize …