This study analyzes the short-term and long-term effects on director commitment and composition of board committees following the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. The first issue we address in the paper is “director commitment”, i.e., whether corporate directors were more or less...

Boards of public corporations in the United States are becoming increasingly independent, due to an effort to ensure that shareholders' interests in the company are protected. Yet, little attention has been given to the way that board members obtain and digest the information necessary for their...

In a paper published in the JFE in 2013, we provided evidence that market participants perceive staggered boards to be on average value-reducing. In a recent response paper, Amihud and Stoyanov (2015) “contest” our results. They advocate using alternative methods for estimating risk-adjusted...

Recommendations of codes on board independence do not match the predictions of optimal board structure theories. We investigate whether firms solve this tradeoff between optimal and recommended levels with gray independent directors, those who do not achieve the formal requirements of...

This paper revisits the staggered board debate focusing on the long-term association of firm value with changes in board structure. We find no evidence that staggered board changes are negatively related to firm value. However, we find a positive relation for firms engaged in innovation and...

Few enterprise operational areas present as much inherent risk or prove as difficult to govern as Information Technology (“IT”). To be successful, IT governance requires enterprise commitment at the very top. Boards and executive management need to extend governance, already exercised over...

We examine Cohen and Wang's (JFE 2013, CW) conclusion that a staggered board (SB) lowers firm value based on the stock price reaction to two 2010 Delaware court rulings in the Airgas case, the first weakening the potency of an SB and the second restoring it. We find that CW's results, for their...

We examine the impact of corporate board reforms on firm value in 41 countries. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that board reforms increase firm value. Reforms involving board and audit committee independence, but not reforms involving separation of chairman and CEO positions,...

The executive suite and the board are closely bound to each other through their fiduciary responsibility to same shareholders. With CEOs' prominent role in both governing bodies, their independence from CEOs' self-serving behavior might be related to each other. We explore the interdependence...

In the last decade, the balance of power between shareholders and boards has shifted dramatically. Changes in both the marketplace and the legal landscape governing it have turned the call for empowered shareholders into a new reality. Correspondingly, the authority that boards of directors have...