We adapt the classical Schaefer model of fisheries management to take into account intergenerational equity, in the line of Sumaila ([18]) and Sumaila and Walters ([19]). The resulting discount rate then is non-constant, and the planner’s preferences are time inconsistent, so that optimal...

Culture is a complex non-linear system. In order to design computer simulations of cultural systems, it is necessary to break the system down into sub-systems. Human culture is modular. It consists of sets of people that belong to economic units. Access to, and control over matter, energy and...

We illuminate several important aspects of the nature and causes of growth and institutional change. To do this, we focus on the role resource pressures have played in the historic development of Hawaii’s institutions. We discuss the Hawaiian story in the context of the natural co-evolution of...

This paper reviews the concepts of marine ecosystem services and their economic valuation in a European fisheries management perspective. We find that the concept is at best cumbersome for advising on how best to regulate fisheries even in an ecosystem context. We propose that operational...

The European Union has adopted recently an ambitious strategy for developing the Bioeconomy in Europe. In this context, algae represent an emerging biological resource of great importance for its potential applications in different fields, including food and feed. Algae have been already used as...

A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we address the problem of allocating the profits between the charter members and the entrants, once the nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement.Using game theory we argue...

We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real-world data. Fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players' actions, revealing the profit structure of...

From a game theoretical perspective, a prerequisite for an international fishery agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect their benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is...