With the Euro Area context in mind, we show that currency arrangements impact on credit available through default incentives. To this end we build a symmetric two-country model with money and imperfect credit market integration. Differences in credit market integration are captured by variations...

We develop a model in which financial intermediaries hold liquidity to protect themselves from shocks. Depending on parameter values, banks may choose to hold too much or too little liquidity on aggregate compared with the socially optimal amount. The model endogenously generates a situation of...

This paper shows that currency arrangements impact on credit available through default incentives. To this end we build a symmetric two-country model with money and imperfect credit market integration. With the Euro Area context in mind, we capture differences in credit market integration by...

This paper shows that currency arrangements impact on credit available through default incentives. To this end we build a symmetric two-country model with money and imperfect credit market integration. With the Euro Area context in mind, we capture differences in credit market integration by...

This paper analyzes a two-country model of currency, banks and endogenous default to study whether impediments to credit market integration across jurisdictions impact the desirability of a currency union. We show that when those impediments induce a higher cost for banks to manage cross-border...

This paper analyzes a two-country model of money and banks to examine the conditions under which the creation of a monetary union between two countries is optimal. Is is shown that if agents resort to banks to adjust their monetary holdings through borrowing and if nobody can force them to repay...

This paper shows that currency arrangements impact on credit available through default incentives. To this end we build a symmetric two-country model with money and imperfect credit market integration. With the Euro Area context in mind, we capture differences in credit market integration by...