Within Kyle's single auction model, we show that an ambiguity-averse insider, who is uncertain about the market maker's beliefs, implements a robust trading strategy, so that she selects as her market order that which maximizes her expected profits against those beliefs which penalize her most....

In an asset market with explicit trading rules we characterize the trading activity of an ambiguity-averse insider who faces Knightian uncertain over other market participants' beliefs and implements a robust trading strategy. Such insider employs a max-min choice mechanism, so that in any round...

We consider the impact of pessimism on monetary policy within a model with backward looking expectations and persistence in the dynamics of output and inflation. We show that pessimistic monetary authorities move their instruments to hedge against the worst economic shocks. With respect to their...

Using a standard monetary policy model, we study how foreign exchange intervention may be used to condition the perception among economic agents of the objective of the policymaker. Foreign exchange intervention does not bring about a systematic policy again, such as an increase in the...

We propose a general framework for the analysis of dynamic optimization with risk-averse agents, extending Whittle's (Whittle, 1990) formulation of risk-sensitive optimal control problems to accommodate time-discounting. We show how, within a Markovian set-up, optimal risk-averse behavior is...

We develop a model of optimal dissemination of private information by a short- sighted raider within a market for a risky asset. Because the raider is risk-averse and atomistic, her trades cannot directly affect prices. In addition, because she is short- sighted she needs to liquidate her...