Minimum cost spanning tree problems connect agents efficiently to a source with the cost of using an edge fixed. We revisit the dispute between the Kar and folk solutions, two solution concepts to divide the common cost of connection based on the Shapley value. We introduce a property called...

Minimum cost spanning tree problems connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points and the cost of using an edge is fixed. The folk and cycle-complete cost sharing solutions always offer core allocations. We provide similar characterizations for both. A new...

Even though kidney exchange became an important source of kidney transplants over the last decade with the introduction of market design techniques to organ transplantation, the shortage of kidneys for transplantation is greater than ever. Due to biological disadvantages, patient populations of...

In a claims problem, we propose a new game for strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule. In contrast to Li and Ju (Mimeo, 2016) and Tsay and Yeh (Games and Economic Behavior, 113, 515-532, 2019), our game is "procedurally fair" (claimants are treated equally) and...

The literature of welfare-maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays remarkably little attention to equity. This paper introduces three ways to consider efficiency and equity simultaneously. The first method, inspired by Kant and Rawls, maximises net present welfare, without...

Cooperative behavior as well as other cultural rules and values are made explicit in organizational units that procure and provide a common service. The common service is procured by a club, which consists of a user-value function, a representation governance, and a budgetallocation function....

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It...

The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...

We study the problem of rationing a divisible good among a group of people. Each person’s preferences are characterized by an ideal amount that he would prefer to receive and a minimum quantity that he will accept: any amount less than this threshold is just as good as receiving nothing at...

We study the assignment of objects to people via lotteries. We consider the implementation of solutions that are based only on ordinal preferences over the objects. There are three natural ways of comparing lotteries, each of which corresponds to a different notion of Nash equilibrium. For each...