Showing 141 - 150 of 705,727
asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem … distorts the operation of credit markets. We show that a binding CVaR constraint introduces credit rationing and lowers social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334832
information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380234
This chapter provides new evidence on borrowers' hidden information about their riskiness and its link to their impatience. To do so, I analyze consumer loans on the German platform Smava, which has a unique peer-to-peer lending process. Observationally identical but unobservably riskier...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009790498
It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not have this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365861
Within a framework of debt renegotiation and a priori private information, what is the role of outside and inside collateral? The literature shows that unobservability of the project’s returns implies that the high-risk borrower is more inclined to pledge outside collateral than is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489185
The effects of bank competition and institutions on credit markets are usually studied separately although both factors … credit contract) and explicitly capture the impact of the institutional environment. Most importantly, we show that the … environment. We predict that firms' access to credit increases in bank competition if institutions are weak but bank competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343924
The presence of private information about a firm can affect the competition among potential lenders. In the Sharpe (1990) model of information asymmetry among lenders (with the von Thadden (2004) correction), an uninformed outside bank faces a winner's curse when competing with an informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128055
based on the theory of relationship lending and lending technologies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117601
Using a unique dataset of credit card mailings, we show that during the recent credit boom, consumers with mediocre … credit scores received more credit card solicitations than those with high credit scores. However, this relationship reversed …, were not excluded from the credit market, but received fewer and less-favorable o ers, especially as they approach being …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093419
This paper addresses the topic regarding the desirability of competition in banking industry. In a model where banks compete on both deposit and loan markets and where banks can use monitoring technology to control entrepreneurs' behavior, we investigate three questions: what are the effects of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013152326