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This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079805
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu,1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491781
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485538
We propose an extension to smooth fictitious play and prove that play converges to an ε-Markov perfect equilibrium with probability one in a class of stochastic games known as Markov potential games. We then prove a partial Folk theorem for repeated games under one-period perfect monitoring. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014235696
This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games — the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponents’ behavior and to comply with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014052195
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071298
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002340837
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603099
This article gives a brief introduction to reputation effects. A canonical model is described, the reputation bound … result of Fudenberg and Levine (1989 1992) and the temporary reputation result of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, 2007 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223232
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …'s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070419