We use prospect theory to model reference dependent consumers, where the reference point is the average behavior of the society in the current period. We show that after a finite number of steps under any equilibrium, the distribution of wealth will become and remain equal, or admit a missing...

Motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias both in experiments and in real markets, we study this phenomenon from a decision-theoretic prospective, focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty. We develop an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive...

Motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias both in experiments and in real markets, we study this phenomenon from a decision-theoretic prospective, focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty. We develop an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive...

Many violations of the Independence axiom of Expected Utility can be traced to subjects' attraction to risk-free prospects. The key axiom in this paper, Negative Certainty Independence (Dillenberger, 2010), formalizes this tendency. Our main result is a utility representation of all preferences...

We study the behavior of an agent who dislikes large choice sets because of the ‘cost of thinking’ involved in choosing from them. Focusing on preferences over lotteries of menus, we introduce the notion of Thinking Aversion. We characterize preferences as the difference between an affine...

Many violations of the Independence axiom of Expected Utility can be traced to subjects' attraction to risk-free prospects. Negative Certainty Independence, the key axiom in this paper, formalizes this tendency. Our main result is a utility representation of all preferences over monetary...

Ellsberg's experiment involved a gamble with no ambiguity (N) and a gam- ble where the prize that could be won is objectively known, but the winning probability depends on the (ambiguous) urn's composition (P). We extend this by including a gamble where the winning probability is objectively...