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This paper examines how strategic alliances to create and use standards affect economic growth and development. The explanation of the link from standards to economic growth and development is through the effects of standards on the incentives to perform industrial research and development...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025822
This paper develops the theory of a U relation between seller concentration and R&D investment and integrates the new theory with the traditional expectation of an inverted-U relation. The paper illustrates the U relation, and the integrated U and inverted-U relations, for a single type of R&D...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025842
We study the problem faced by the entrepreneur seeking outside support to turn an entrepreneurial idea into a successful innovation — specifically a successful technological innovation resulting from research and development. The paper develops and tests the hypothesis that as an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026656
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When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so-called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249563
This paper develops the theory of a U relation between seller concentration and R&D investment and integrates the new theory with the traditional expectation of an inverted-U relation. The paper illustrates the U relation, and the integrated U and inverted- U relations, for a single type of R&D...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764263
When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328839