This paper models a key outcome of secret negotiations: partial-leniency fine discounts from plea bargaining in criminal price-fixing cases. Models tested explain up to 52% of variation in percentage discounts. A minor portion is explained by such defendants characteristics as the defendant s...

Periods of profound innovation and technological change invariably result in short run winners and losers. The rise of big box retailers like Wal-Mart, as well as the existence of large supermarket chains, has led competition authorities to focus anew on the issue of buyer power. Antitrust...

The recent Microsoft antitrust case had many profound implications, one of which was possible insight into the changing role of economics in antitrust. Microsoft started out as a "post-Chicago" theoretical case in which game theory and asymmetric information models suggested the software firm...

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges...

In this Article we focus upon an area in which greater convergence of U.S. policy with the practice of many foreign countries is long overdue: the treatment of public policies that suppress competition. Whereas the European Union (“EU”) and numerous other jurisdictions have taken strong...

This submission was made in response to the invitation of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary."Incipiency" describes the test under which mergers, acquisitions, and certain anticompetitive practices are...

This paper provides comments on the investigation by the US House Judiciary Committee (“the Committee”) into the state of competition in the digital marketplace. The comments focus on the third topic identified by the Committee:"Whether the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement...

The COVID-19 pandemic could cause Congress to strengthen our merger laws. The authors of this short article strongly urge Congress to do this, but to do this in a manner that ignores 5 myths that underpin current merger policy: Myth 1: Mergers Eliminate Wasteful Redundancies and Produce More...

As part of their investigation of competition in digital markets, members of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives solicited the views of a number of antitrust scholars on whether existing U.S. antitrust laws are adequate to address contemporary competition concerns. This...