Since at least the early nineteenth century, much of “political economy” had become occupied with “resource allocation”. It became occupied with understanding the relative merits of economic systems coordinated by decentralized processes (market-mediated exchange) or by centralized...

This paper presents a unique historical experiment to explore the dynamics of institutional change in the Middle Ages. We have assembled a novel dataset, where information on political institutions for northern-central Italian cities between 1000 and 1300 is matched with detailed information on...

A theory is introduced to systematically explain autocracies' diverse experiences with taxation. State power relative to citizens' capacity for violence determines the limit of taxation, the highest tax rate that citizens will tolerate and pay. Rulers can spend resources on coercion to increase...

We recast the synthetic controls for evaluating policies as a counterfactual prediction problem and replace its linear regression with a nonparametric model inspired by machine learning. The proposed method enables us to achieve more accurate counterfactual predictions. We apply our method to a...

Activist NGOs increasingly oppose industrial projects that have nevertheless been approved by public regulators. To understand this recent rise in NGO activism, we develop a theory of optimal regulation in which a regulated industry seeks to undertake a project that may be harmful to society. On...

Activist NGOs increasingly oppose industrial projects that have nevertheless been approved by public regulators. To understand this recent rise in NGO activism, we develop a theory of optimal regulation in which a regulated industry seeks to undertake a project that may be harmful to society. On...

Cooperatives represent an alternative to large-scale corporate farms and plantations as well as to independent unaffiliated small private farms. This paper presents a comparative modeling narrative on cooperative organizational forms' potential impact on equitable rural development. This speaks...

Traditional theories of democracy suggest that political representation of excluded groups can reduce their incentives to engage in conflict. We consider the response of elites whose power is threatened by new political actors and study the consequences of political inclusion in a context of...

Reforms often restrict the use of specific police tactics. We identify a possible unintended consequence of such reforms: that police will sabotage the new rules by substituting one tactic for another. We show that police in Chicago responded to new restrictions on pedestrian stops by making...

Mediator proposals can accelerate agreement and increase welfare even if the mediator is entirely uninformed. We demonstrate this by adding random mediation to the Cramton (1992) bargaining model. Mediation increases welfare by pooling types, which reduces signaling costs. When mediation is...