This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega …). The results are more profound when bank lenders are more powerful and reputable and have a prior lending relationship with …

compensation increase a bank’s contribution to systemic distress risk and systemic crash risk. We also predict and find that this … CEO incentive–systemic risk relation operates through three channels: (i) a bank’s engagement in non-interest income … relation is moderated by information transparency, bank size, market liquidity, and financial crisis. We also discuss relevant …

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of … (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in …

focus bank managers' attention on the long-run and discourage them from investing in high-risk, value-destroying projects …In the wake of the global financial crisis, attention has often focused on whether incentives generated by bank … for bank executives: incentive compensation should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options …

. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use … employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about … three main conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon …

post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …

model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a … reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about three main … conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon increases the cost …