Excess control rights by inside shareholders have been documented to hurt minority shareholders. This paper shows that such governance feature may benefit creditors. Using a sample of U.S. dual-class firms, I show that these firms take less operational and financial risk than similar...

We examine the governance role of multiple large shareholder structures (MLSS) to determine their valuation effects in a sample of 1,252 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies. We find that the presence, number, and size of multiple large shareholders are associated with a...

This paper discusses the influence of ownership segments and disciplining devices on the quality of Corporate Governance (CG) in the Indian context. The ultimate objective of the study is to identify the determinant ownership segment and their disciplining device that would explain the CG...

Corporate governance can play an important complementary role in banking regulation by limiting excessive risk-taking by managers and shareholders at the expense of creditors, including small depositors. This paper provides a detailed analysis of corporate governance in Russia's 30 largest banks...

Debt is analyzed in relation to the conflict between three parties, a controlling shareholder, outside investors and creditors. We follow Jensen and Meckling's (1976) and Myers' (1977) intuitions that a leverage may result in excess value appropriation by creditors while at the same time acting...

If a bidder launches a takeover offer for a listed company being part of a stock market index, then index funds and exchange traded funds (ETF) as shareholders of this company cannot easily tender their shares without losing track of the index. This paper analyzes the impact of index fund and...

This paper examined the association between ownership structure, firm performance and dividend policy with respect to Governance perspective of companies present in Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). A sample of 45 Non-financial KSE-100 Index listed firms for a period of 2010 to 2013 has been taken...

Using a comprehensive international sample of 18,932 firms across 40 countries, we find that cross-country variations in ownership concentration are attributable to differences in firm sizes. Ownership concentration in large firms differs strikingly between countries. For example, large U.S....

This study examines the effects of the firm's ownership concentration and its institutional environment on corporate debt maturity choices. As ownership concentration and debt maturity are alternative governance mechanisms, we theorize and investigate whether their association is influenced by...

Building on the theory of Burkart et al. (2003) that family ownership and control of firms mitigate the twin conflicts between owners and managers and between majority and minority owners, we suggest that the allocation of firm ownership rights and informal governance within controlling families...