How and to what extent do managerial control benefits shape the efficiency of the takeover market? We revisit this question by estimating both the dark and bright sides of managerial control benefits in an industry equilibrium model. On the dark side, managers' private benefits of control...

Based on hand-collected information on private companies listed in the Chinese SME stock market, this paper studies how family involvement and political connection affect firms' IPO underpricing. Especially, we investigate how underpricing varies with higher- and ordinary level political...

This study examines the impacts of business group affiliation, ownership disparity, and corporate governance on cash holdings and the value of excess cash of firms, using business group data from Korea, where such organizations are called “chaebols.” We find that Korean chaebol-affiliated...

We show that dual-class shares can be a solution to agency conflicts rather than a result of agency conflicts. When firms with a controlling shareholder issue voting shares to fund projects, the risk of losing control rises, which can threaten the controller's private benefits. Thus, incumbents...

We examine whether institutions' monitoring effectiveness is related to the number of their blockholdings. We find that the number of blocks that a firm's large institutions hold is positively associated with forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, abnormal returns...

We examine the relation between the presence of an independent director who is a blockholder (IDB) and corporate policies, risk-taking and market valuation. After accounting for endogeneity, firms with an IDB have significantly (1) lower levels of cash holdings, payout and R&D expenditures, (2)...

We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equitybacked firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....

In this paper, we consider the corporate governance challenge of protecting outside investors in listed, controlled firms. European jurisdictions are supposed to be more veteran and skilled in dealing with these firms in comparison to the U.S. But we argue that outside investors in European...

Grounded in agency theory, this paper investigates the effect of board independence on managerial ownership. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock that raises board independence. Our...

This paper examines the valuation effects associated with the incentive structures of different types of institutional investors using the ownership levels of public and private pension funds in a firm. The results suggest that institutional monitoring is associated with valuation effects when...